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The Russian Fish with Caviar
RANDY REZABEK
Abstract Historians have noted that the capture of the ‘‘Russian Fish’’ from the
Germans was probably the most important outcome of the 1945 TICOM
operation. Recently declassified documents have now provided a wealth of infor-
mation pertaining to this vital break into Soviet communications at the dawn of
the Cold War.
Keywords Caviar, GdNA Groupe VI, Karrenberg, Russian Fish, Steeple
Clayton, TICOM
Introduction
The first account in the open literature of the top-secret 1945 TICOM (Target
Intelligence Committee) mission to capture German cryptologic materials, person-
nel, and equipment was by Thomas Parrish in his 1986 book, The Ultra Americans.
In a chapter entitled, ‘‘The Russian Fish,’’ he provided a general description of the
operation and featured its most important outcome, the capture in Bavaria of
a German intercept unit that specialized in the collection of Soviet multichannel tele-
type signals. The capture of this equipment and its operating personnel came at
a moment, now that Germany was defeated, when Anglo-American intelligence offi-
cials began to focus their attention on the ‘‘Russian Problem.’’ Parrish revealed that
this unit was ‘‘flown to England, where the equipment was set up at an installation
about twenty miles from Bletchley. It appears to have been put to work by the Allies
immediately’’ [10, p. 284].
A year after Parrish’s book was published, an amazing article appeared; a photo
essay of the mission from the personal collection of Lt. Paul Whitaker, one of the
TICOM officers who was a member of the team that recovered the ‘‘Russian Fish’’
at Rosenheim [15]. The photographs of the then still top-secret operation showed the
progress of the TICOM team from Bletchley Park through various scenes in
Germany to the digging up of the equipment by the PWs.
Little further information was published about the operation until James
Bamford recounted the story in his second book on the NSA, Body of Secrets. He
added a few additional details from other aspects of the mission, but concluded that
the capture of the ‘‘Russian Fish’’ was ‘‘one of the most important, and most secret,
discoveries in the history of Cold War codebreaking. . . .The discovery of the
Russian code breaking machine was a principal reason why both the U.S. and British
governments still have an absolute ban [as of 2002] on all details surrounding the
TICOM operation’’ [4, p. 15, 17].
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The following year, in his account of the TICOM mission, Michael Smith added
the fact that ‘‘the top secret equipment was taken together with its operators, to
Wavendon Manor where it was set up and tested against real Soviet transmitters.’’
Richard Aldrich, in his history of the GCHQ, revealed that once the ‘‘Russian Fish’’
operation was set up in England it was given the codename ‘‘Caviar.’’1
These authors provided the gist of the story, but as these things go, the full story
is much more nuanced and complex. Recent declassified TICOM documents from
the NSA are beginning to fill in the details, including the identities of the German
PWs, the number and types of the teletype receivers, the location of initial operations
in England, and the type of Soviet traffic intercepted.
The Discovery
On 21 May 1945, TICOM Team 1 (Figure 1) officers Lt. Cdr. Howard Campaigne,
Maj. Edward Rushworth, and Capt. Thomas Carter went to the POW camp at Bad
Aibling to follow up on a tip that a German prisoner, an Unteroffizier Dietrich
Suschowk, had knowledge of certain signals intelligence equipment and documentation
pertaining to the interception and decoding of Russian traffic. Suschowk explained to
the TICOM team that he worked for General der Nachrichten Aufkla¨rung (GdNA)
Gruppe VI, a platoon size unit lately responsible for intercepting high level Soviet radio
teleprinter traffic. The last location of this unit was at the Pionier-Kaserne, a barracks
at Rosenheim, Bavaria. Suschowk, described as ‘‘the natural leader’’ of this group of
20 or so prisoners, was eager to cooperate with the Allies [7, Appendix 14].
The next day, the TICOM officers returned to Bad Aibling and escorted the
Gruppe VI prisoners back to their quarters at Rosenheim (Figure 2), now occupied
by a U.S. Army ration dump, and were put to work digging up the equipment buried
under the cobblestones (Figure 3). The prisoners recovered a dozen large chests, 53
smaller chests, and another 53 boxes totaling about 7.5 tons [4, p. 16]. Suschowk and
his team then volunteered to put one of the machines together and demonstrated that
it was in good working order. TICOMofficer 1st Lt. PaulWhitaker, who had joined the
party at Rosenheim, later reported, ‘‘They were intercepting Russian traffic right while
we were there. And pretty soon they had shown us all we needed to see’’ [10, p. 283].
The equipment was a special receiver that the Germans called the ‘‘HMFS’’
(Hartmehrfachfernschreiber; i.e., multichannel intercept teletype).2 Designed to
intercept the Soviet equivalent of the ‘‘Fish’’ traffic, these encrypted radio teletype
signals had a twist (Figure 4). The Russians had devised a method to break the mess-
age into pieces and to transmit these segments multiplexed on up to nine separate
channels. Without knowledge of the signal characteristics and the proper equipment,
interception was very difficult.
The German prisoners and their gear were then taken to Seventh Army H.Q. in
Augsburg and held awaiting transportation to the U.K. This provided both TICOM
and Seventh Army G-2 an opportunity to initially interrogate the prisoners, who
consisted of a senior NCO, three mechanics, 11 operators, two decoders, and four
evaluators. Three in particular were found to be most helpful. The aforementioned
Suschowk was described as an intelligent man with a firm grasp of the specialized
1See [13, p. 293] and [3, p. 49].
2IF-162, Evaluation of Multichannel Teletype (HMFS). NSA FOIA case #64093, 29
March 2011.
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apparatus and its operating procedures. Unteroffizier Werner Hempel, an engineer
by profession, was not only responsible for maintaining the equipment but also
helped the Lorenz Company build it. TICOM commented, ‘‘He is not a leader like
Suschowk, preferring as he does to get on with his job in a quiet and apparently
efficient way.’’ However, the most useful prisoner for TICOM eventually proved
to be Unteroffizier Erich Karrenberg, a cryptanalyst. He was born in Poltava, Russia
in 1911, the son of a German manufacturer. After being educated in Russia, he
returned to Germany in 1930 to study music and was later employed as a lecturer
in the History of Art and Music at Berlin University. He either joined the Army
in 1939 or was called up in 1941 (sources vary), but nevertheless he ended up utilizing
his Russian language skills in a wire-tapping detachment at the front. After a stint
Figure 1. TICOM Team 1 in Germany: (left to right) PFCWilliam E. Hoin (US), driver; LAC
L.H. Howells (BR), radio communicator, F=Lt. Geroge H. Sayers (BR); Lt.=CDR Howard H.
Campaigne (US); Sgt. H.G. Anderson (BR) radio communicator; Capt. Louis T. Stone (US);
1st Lt. Selmer S. Norland (US); Maj. Angus McIntosh (BR); Major Ralph P. Tester (BR);
Capt. Edward Rushworth (BR); W=Cmd. Oscar A. Oester (BR); Sgt. Clarence L. Ray (US),
driver. (Photo by Paul K. Whitaker, originally published in Whitaker and Kruh [15].)
Figure 2. The courtyard at Pionier-Kaserne barracks at Rosenheim, Bavaria, 23 May 1945.
(Photo by Paul K. Whitaker, originally published in Whitaker and Kruh [15].)
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teaching Russian to trainees at an Army school, he took a cryptologic course in
August 1944 at Ju¨terbog and was later assigned to GdNA Gruppe VI, Referat 1b,
where he specialized in working out the daily letter-scramble of the teletype text that
the Russians transmitted.3 TICOM’s German specialist, Dr. Frederick Pickering,
started chatting with Karrenberg during the packing of the equipment. Karrenberg’s
use of certain technical terms such as ‘‘wheel-lengths,’’ ‘‘turnovers,’’ and ‘‘depths’’
alerted Pickering that this was a specialized unit on par with Government Code
Figure 3. German PWs from Gruppe VI, GdNA, at Rosenheim digging up the equipment
buried in the courtyard, 22 May 1945. (Photo by Paul K. Whitaker, originally published in
Whitaker and Kruh [15].)
Figure 4. The Russian FISH itself, probably the Gera¨t 1309, or ‘‘HMFS’’ universal set. (Photo
by Paul K. Whitaker, originally published in Whitaker and Kruh [15].)
3CSDIC SIR 1717, Consolidated Report of Six German Prisoners of the General der
Nachrichten Aufkla¨rung (Army Intercept Service). British National Archives, Kew, Surrey
(PRO), HW 40=166. Available from Christos Military and Intelligence Corner, http://www.
scribd.com/doc/85584902/CSDIC-SIR-1717 (accessed 7 July 2012).
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and Cipher School’s (GC&CS) units assigned to break the German ‘‘Fish.’’ ‘‘We
have not, in our TICOM field experience, met a more intelligent batch of Germans,’’
Pickering later wrote. He immediately recommended that Karrenberg and his fellow
NCOs be transported to England for detailed interrogations.4
Initial processing and transportation difficulties delayed the party at Augsburg.
The equipment, all 7.5 tons, was boxed up and flown to the U.K. on 5 June
accompanied byMaj. Rushworth and Capt. Carter. Six of the GdNA prisoners, selec-
ted for further interrogations, went by road to the jail in Wiesbaden, accompanied
by Lt. Whitaker. In addition to Suschowk, Hempel, and Karrenberg, this group
also included Unteroffiziers Erdmann, a specialist in NKVD traffic, Grubler, an
electrician and radio mechanic, and Schmitz, an intercept operator.
Tests at Steeple Clayton
The men were delayed in travel and did not arrive in England until 29 June, when
they were sent to a site at Steeple Clayton, a village some 15miles southwest of
Bletchley Park. The captured gear sent down to the site by TICOM in the previous
two days awaited their arrival, and the party was immediately put to work recon-
structing the intercept equipment. Despite a few technical delays such as fitting
the proper type heads to the printers and a lack of some test meters and tools, the
nine-channel universal set was set up by the next evening. In addition to the
intercept receiver, a wide band Fu. H.E.c., with two antennas, one 30 meters tall
in a tree and the other an 18 meter on a mast were erected.5 As a test, the German
operator picked up some loud and clear Russian signals.6
The next day, 1 July, the printers were connected to the intercept unit and
operations began. By midday, some traffic on a two-channel circuit around 8MHz
was intercepted, and by evening, the nine-channel Baku station (at 12.6MHz) was
picked up. Karrenberg kept busy preparing charts and index headings to begin the
documentation of the intercepts. The Baku traffic was unencrypted and provided
data such as locations of factories, the names of their managers, imports, shortages,
and various types of commercial information.
At this point, the TICOM officials debated the question of priority. The engin-
eer, Mr. Harold Kenworthy,7 wanted to limit operations in order to do an in-depth
examination of the machinery, but the traffic analysts, Capt. Jack Magilavy and
D.R. Uzielli, wanted copious traffic. Since TICOM had shown a deep interest in
the nature of the Soviet traffic, a decision was made to let the Germans practice their
craft since ‘‘example was better than theory.’’
‘‘On subsequent days therefore, the operators worked under the general direc-
tion of the evaluator (Karrenberg); they picked out the circuits which would give
4TICOM IF-5 Notes on Field Interrogations of Various German Army and Air Force
SIGINT Personnel. NARA-CP, RG 457, Entry P-4, Box 1, Item #7419, 9.
5Fu. H.E.c, Funkhorch Empfa¨nger-c (Monitoring receiver), 3.5 to 25MHz. For illustra-
tions of this set, see http://www.laud.no/ww2/fuhec/index.htm (accessed 30 May 2011).
6Details about the operations at Steeple Clayton are all from TICOMM-8, Diary kept by
Capt. T. Cartes, I.C. of Tests on Baudot Equipment conducted in the U.K. June 29 to July 8,
1945. NARA-CP, RG 457 Entry 9037, Box 44, Item #6862.
7Kenworthy, former Marconi engineer and pre-war signals expert for the Metropolitan
Police intercept station that collected diplomatic traffic for GC&CS, was by this time the chief
of the Foreign Office Research and Development Establishment (FORDE) responsible for the
interception of German ‘‘Tunny’’ traffic at the Y station at Knockholt, Kent.
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him the T.A. data he required, held them for as long as he wanted and then
left them.’’8
Over the next few days, traffic from two-channel and nine-channel circuits was
printing solidly. The German PWs had attempted to set up the six-channel machine
to monitor traffic on a Rostov-Moscow circuit but had experienced trouble due
to jamming from an American commercial transmitter. The efficiency of the six-
channel set was questioned, but the prisoners insisted that it was their best set;
having been built in 1939, it served them in Russia.
Controversy among the TICOM evaluators continued with the engineers eager
to get into the equipment, pointing out that there were many reception problems at
the current site, there was a lack of directional aerials and facilities for diversity
reception, and the few sets operating could not provide adequate coverage anyway.
The operation’s commander, Capt. Carter, felt that that they had a unique opport-
unity to observe German interception and traffic analysis technique firsthand, rather
than learning about it through interrogations. A compromise was reached in the
usual manner, and it was agreed to continue to collect traffic but put an increasing
importance to the technical considerations.9
Finding that the propagation conditions were much better in the evening, an
evening shift was added to the workload. By this time, some 10 to 12 two-channel
links were discovered, but most of them were sending only synchronization signals.
The Baku circuit continued to transmit unencrypted traffic of no great value. Work
continued in setting up a second two-channel set, and the Germans were assisting in
translating technical instructions.
However, the activity at Steeple Clayton was beginning to attract attention. The
post office delivered a complaint that there was interference with local reception of
the B.B.C. In addition, the amount of equipment the group was powering was
exceeding the local 15 amps limit. Capt. Carter bought time by requesting the local
authorities to investigate the trouble from their end and to let them know the results.
Over the next few days, work continued with both the engineers and the
evaluators gaining confidence over their mastery of the system. A second two-channel
machine was up and running in a separate hut by British personnel without German
help. The T.A. effort was yielding results. However, the post office authorities were
still concerned, reported that the trouble was in the electrical mains, and asked if
the group had any unusual electrical machinery. A noncommittal reply was given.
The next day, 6 July, Capt. Carter along with the engineers, Kenworthy and
Mason, reported to Bletchley Park to brief TICOM officials. The technical challenges
of the site along with the unwanted attention from the post office resulted in the
decision to cease operations in the next 24 hours. The Carter party was asked to write
recommendations for both the short-term disposal and the longer-term future of the
equipment and POWs.
The following day, final tests of components of the last nine-channel set were
completed in the frame of the original machine while the rest of the equipment was
packed up. The six-channel set was finally made to work satisfactorily. An interrog-
ation team from TICOM also came down that morning to conduct the first formal
interview of Karrenberg. It was also learned that Unffz. Erdmann, the NKVD
specialist, was married with a wife and five children in the Soviet zone and would
8TICOM M-8, 3.
9Ibid., 4.
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be unable to go home. Carter and the rest of the TICOM officers, always sensitive
about the morale and motivations of their prisoners, were concerned.
The collection effort of Karrenberg’s unit, GdNA Gruppe VI section 1b, was
specifically responsible for the interception and evaluation of Russian Baudot
traffic.10 Its work could be broken down into three phases; interception, decryption
via key recovery, and supporting traffic analysis, all of which were demonstrated
during its week at Steeple Clayton. However, Karrenberg and his fellows could
not explain everything; the output of Gruppe VI had been sent to GdNA Gruppe
IV, the cryptanalytic division, whose section 3, under Lt. Alex Dettmann, did the
actual analysis and evaluation of the Russian materials. Gaps in this knowledge were
filled in piece by piece by TICOM over the next few months by careful examination
of captured documents and further interrogations of other German personnel [1].
The Technology
The technology behind the interception of ‘‘Russian Fish’’ can be traced back to 1874
and the efforts of the French telegraph engineer Jean-Maurice-E´mile Baudot. In a
desire to increase the speed, amount, and accuracy of transmitted text, Baudot
adapted principles of the Hughes telegraphic printer and a five-unit code devised
by Gauss and Weber to invent what would now be described as a synchronous time
division multiplex system. The heart of his system was a distributor, which rotated
brushes over a set of contacts, which connected a series of transmitter and receiver
circuits into a single line. This allowed up to four channels to operate simultaneously
[8]. The transmitted characters were interleaved so that the signal occurred in differ-
ent time slots. Further development of multiplexing byWestern Union allowed for the
simultaneous transmission of eight channels by 1913. By 1936, furtherWestern Union
development of the Varioplex increased capacity to 72 channels of transmission [11].
The code Baudot devised for this system represented letters of the alphabet with
five electrical impulses, the unit representing either a pulse (mark) or its absence
(space). This resulted in 32 combinations, 26 representing the letters of the alphabet
and six that could be assigned as control characters, such as a shift or a number. In
contemporary terms, it can be described as a five-bit code.
The transmission was generated by a skilled operator manipulating a series of five
piano-like keys in the proper pattern to generate the character signal, which could be
printed out at the receiving end. In 1902, Charles Krum, a cold storage engineer,
devised a ‘‘start-stop’’ code sequence to add to the Bardot code that allowed auto-
mation of the transmission. Both the transmitter and the receiver were now cued as
to the start of the next 5-bit sequence, allowing a standard typewriter device to become
the keyer. In 1908, the Morkrum Company developed the first commercial printing
machine, and by the First World War this technology was being adopted by cable
companies, railroads, and other corporations that had a need to communicate large
amounts of textual data [9]. By this time, paper tape readers had been devised which
allowed the message to be punched out ahead of transmission and then run through a
reader. The communication demands of the war led to military interest in teletype, but
10This unit was part of the signal intelligence service of the army High Command, the
Oberkommando des Heeres=General der Nachrlchten Aufkla¨rung (OKH=GdNA), not as
Parrish stated, the Armed Forces High Command signal agency, OKW=Chi. For a description
of the organizational structure of GdNA, see [6, vol. 4, p. 12–16].
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they also had to contend with the additional difficulty of security. Gilbert Vernam, an
AT&T engineer, developed an automatic means to encrypt the Bardot code punched
onto the paper tapes. By creating another tape of randomly generated letters (a key)
and running it in step with the plain text, the two message streams could be added
together with Boolean ‘‘exclusive or’’ (XOR) function to create a cipher of the original
message. Thus, a spaceþ space¼mark; a markþ space¼mark; a spaceþmark¼
mark; and a markþmark¼ space. By reversing the logic at the receiving end with
an identical key, it would automatically recover the original plain text message.
However, this system had a weakness, as identified by U.S. Army Signal Corps
officer Major Joseph Mauborgne in 1918. The key tape had been formed into a loop
and run continuously through the reader. If the message was long enough, this
key sequence was repeated, creating a critical clue that would be exploited by a crypt-
analyst. Mauborgne’s solution to this problem was to utilize a key sequence that was
as long as the message, thus never repeating. This created an unbreakable one-time
tape system [17, p. 270–275]. However, this system was logistically difficult to man-
age, it required that two copies be produced of the key tape for each message, and
could only be used once.
Teletype systems continued to develop throughout the 1920s and came into
common use by both commercial and military users. By the beginning of World
War II, German military communications services were replacing the paper key tape
with encryption machines to produce the key sequence used in encrypted teletype
messages. The Siemens T-52 Geheimschreiber and the Lorenz SZ-40=42 devices
were based upon this design. The United States was rather late in getting into this
game, not producing a similar crypto device until 1944 when it came out with the
SIGTOT.11 Multiplexing also continued to develop among the belligerents with
the British developing a pulse-modulated microwave (UHF) radio relay known as
the No. X10A early in the war. The U.S. Army Signal Corps also developed the
AN=TRC series of VHF=UHF multiplexed transceivers utilizing up to seven
channels, primarily for radio relay [14, p. 499].
Thereafter, Vernam encryption and multiplexing of teletype signals became a
common practice among the major powers. The ability of RTTY to cover long distances
without the need for landlines and the capability to transmit vast amounts of detailed
texts without the need for highly trained Morse code operators were ideal for the
Soviet Union. By the mid-thirties, the use of Baudot communications was extending
across the USSR, and the Germans realized that they needed a means to intercept it.
German Developments
In 1936, the OKW contracted with the Berlin firm of Lorenz to design and build a
receiver that could convert the transmitted Baudot impulses into printed text. The
Germans first intercepted Russian traffic of this nature in 1940 in Warsaw, however
other priorities, including a reorganization of the intelligence effort giving the Army
responsibilities for the military and diplomatic intelligence on Russia, followed by the
increased workload of the invasion, put a low priority on the monitoring of Soviet
internal communications [12]. In 1942, a Baudot interception unit was created as part
of the Intercept Control Station, East (HLS Ost) at Lo¨tzen, East Prussia. It was
11‘‘T-52 Geheimschreiber.’’ Crypto Museum. http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/
siemens/index.htm (accessed 19 April 2011); [5, p. 386].
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equipped with the Lorenz technology, two nine-channel, two six-channel, and five
two-channel sets. According to Section Chief Alex Dettmann, there were numerous
problems with reception at Lo¨tzen, and half the intercepted material was unreadable
because of distortion, 35% of the material was of some value, and 15% was private
messages dealing with family matters. Much of the evaluated material was of industrial
and administrative matters, such as manufacturing requirements, plant completions,
personnel training, and routine reports. Nevertheless, the material also included
military matters such as special announcements from high military command and
coded messages between the General Staff and various front staffs. Most of the
Baudot circuits regularly covered included those links between Moscow and major
regional centers such as Baku, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and others, along with inter
regional circuits, including coverage of shipping, airline, and rail traffic [12, p. 2–3].
On 18 September 1943, a very rare meeting between ‘‘Goering’s Research
Bureau,’’ the Forschungsamt (FA), and the Army cryptanalytic service was held at
the FA headquarters in Berlin. The purpose of the meeting was to pass on technical
information from Dr. Martin Pu¨tzel, the head of mathematical research at the FA, to
his counterpart in the Army, Dr. Pietsch.12 Pu¨tzel reported that for some time the FA
had been intercepting Russian Baudot traffic and had made some progress on its
decipherment. Traffic analysis indicated that these circuits were between Moscow
and the high staffs at their Army fronts, communicated on one or two channels.
FA cryptanalysis determined that it was machine-generated cipher with a particular
anomaly; at every pause, it transmitted a compromise of seven characters of appar-
ently pure key before shutting off. This of course produced a major crib for the
cryptanalyst. The deciphered text yielded a plain (non-enciphered) five-digit code.13
Later, Dr. Otto Buggisch, who worked for both GdNA and OKW=Chi during
the war, related to TICOM what he knew of the matter: ‘‘(I) . . . heard in 1943
that the FA had claimed some success on a Russian teletype machine and had
reconstructed the machine. It was a machine with a very long cycle being not
prime but the product of several smaller cycles like the SZ 42.’’ He heard this from
Doering,14 ‘‘who was then doing his research on the T 52 but liaison with the FA
was bad anyway . . . ,’’ and the next Buggisch heard was that the traffic found by
the FA had stopped. Buggisch was again questioned about this teletype machine
success of the FA and answered in written homework that
The FA had analyzed a Russian cipher teleprinter system in 1943, and
recognized that it must have been based on a machine having certain
similarities with the German SZ-40. After a short time, the Russians
altered the system. The FA then communicated its results to my
unit . . .This was one of the very rare cases where the FA and In 7=VI
exchanged results.15 I did not study the FA results at that time, as I
was not responsible for work on cipher teleprinters, and hence can give
12The Forschungsamt was the Nazi party’s signal intelligence bureau, which reported
directly to Herman Goering. They concentrated on internal monitoring and on foreign
diplomatic and commercial communications.
13TICOM DF-98, Russian Baudot Teletype Scrambler. NARA-CP, RG 457, HCC, Box
1394, Item #4459.
14Mathematical researcher in GdNA, a specialist in machine ciphers.
15In 7=VI was the Army predecessor to GdNA.
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no details. At all events the Russian machine (just as in the German types
SZ-40, SZ-42 but in contrast to the T-52 a, b, c, and d) gave only 32 dif-
ferent substitution alphabets, the succession of which became periodic
only after an astronomically large number of steps. This succession was
given by a system of pin wheels the peripheries of which were prime to
each other at an estimate lay between 30 and 90. In any case there was
no complicated mutual influence of the pin wheels on each other (as
for example in the T-52 d). [6, vol. 7, p. 84–85]
Buggisch also added that ‘‘the Mathematics section of In 7=VI . . .worked on it
and at the end of 1943, there was a ‘Kompromiss,’ (compromise) and a depth of 8
messages with the same setting was created. The section was able to recover 1400
letters of pure key, and to determine that the traffic was derived from a 5-figure code.
The Germans postulated a machine like the German T-43, but was [sic] not able to
prove any theories they had.’’ [6, vol. 4, p. 111]
Sometime after September 1943, the Army took the project over from the FA
and assigned their Baudot station to the interception of this Russian traffic.
The haul of gear later captured at Rosenheim included three different types of inter-
cept receivers: the WA PRUF 7=IV, a six-channel machine built by Siemens-Halske,
distinctive in its use of a cammounted on a rotating shaft functioning as the distributor;
the Gera¨t 1313 or the ‘‘HZFS,’’ a two channel receiver; and the Gera¨t 1309, or
‘‘HMFS,’’ a larger, ‘‘universal’’ set that could be configured to operate with two, three,
four, six, or nine channels. Both the HZFS and the HMFS functioned similarly:
1. A standard radio receiver fed the intercepted RF signal into the machine. The
signal was similar to a standard carrier shift teletype circuit, except that the shift
was of 5000Hz rather than the standard 850Hz, indicating that it was probably
generated by two separate crystal oscillators. The standard teletype start=stop
pulse had been deleted from the signal and each individual pulse compressed
to 10 milliseconds, most likely to increase traffic carrying capacity.
2. An automatic Volume Control and a rectifier unit changed the frequency into
direct current.
3. A double mechanical distributor on a single shaft, utilizing brush contacts, syn-
chronized to regenerate each channel. Synchronization, accomplished via the use
of an oscilloscope, could be locked in with automatic circuits. With the HMFS,
different distributors could be inserted into the machine to configure it for the
different number of channels.
4. The output was sent into a pulse regenerator as a final stage that inserted a
start-stop signal into the data flow and then stored it in a band of five relays that
acted as short-term memory buffer (a ‘‘Speicher’’) before being transmitted to a
corresponding teletype printer. This was necessary to expand the compressed
Russian signal back to the standard 20-millisecond length.16
After the Russians went on the offensive and HLS Ost was forced to retreat out
of East Prussia in fall 1944, the Army’s signal intelligence service reorganized into
16TICOM IF-162, Multichannel Intercept Teletype (HMFS). RG 457, Entry 9037, Box
44, Item #6860; and TICOM M-9, Report on German Multiplex Intercept Equipment.
NARA-CP, RG 457, Entry 9037, Box 44, Item #6862.
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the General der Nachrichten Aufklarung. The Baudot intercept section moved from
Lo¨tzen to Zossen and a few months later to Ju¨terbog in an attempt to improve
reception, and was redesigned as Gruppe VI, Section 1b, under the command of
Captain Rowder [6, vol. 4, 11–12, 15, 50, 83–84]. Unteroffizier Karrenberg was
the technician primarily responsible for this traffic. The two-channel enciphered
military traffic (codenamed ‘‘Bandwurm’’ by the Germans), was determined to be
high-level circuits from Moscow to the Front Armies. There were also one or two
links to the Air Force and one possible link to the Far East. Moscow acted as the
net control station, and traffic from one Front Army to the other routed through
this central point.17
Information derived from operator chat, message externals, and the study of
frequent depths in the traffic led to some German assumptions about the system.
Karrenberg stated to TICOM that the system contained two elements: a Baudot tele-
printer producing 32 characters made up of the Russian alphabet along with a figure
and a letter shift, and a cipher attachment consisting of five small wheels driven by
one large wheel, creating a cipher with a period of 43. Despite this knowledge, the
Germans made no effort to reconstruct the wheel patterns.18 The cipher attachment
had two settings, a ‘‘large’’ setting that gave a simple one-letter substitution for
the key (i.e., the wheels of the cipher device did not move) and a ‘‘small’’ setting
that engaged the gears of the cipher device, producing a seemingly endless stream
of non-repeating key. The Russian teleprinter operators used the large setting to
establish contact and test the mechanism.19 This was probably done to simplify
the process of setting up the circuit; the operators only had to refer to a table of
the ‘‘letter of the day’’ to establish contact. This letter, sent in the clear, was repeated
three times to ensure that the receiver had his machine set up correctly.20
Experience with the traffic, specifically close study of preambles, initial contacts,
and operator chat, provided many clues into the cipher. Preambles of messages were
always enciphered, but their stereotypical format and content provided cryptanalysts
a clear insight into the beginnings of the cipher text. Contact traffic of the operators,
in the ‘‘large’’ setting, often gave the setting away. When the key was not revealed in
the set up chat, the Germans could often rely on depths (i.e., repeated messages)
where the same plaintext is transmitted more than once at different positions in
the key stream, giving cryptanalysts a means of comparison. Depths were due to
bad reception, sometimes requiring repeating the message three or four times.
Depths were also caused when the reciprocal station got out of phase with the
sending station and the key sequences did not synchronize. Karrenberg commented,
‘‘When traffic is running smoothly, and on a day when a lot of material is
transmitted, one can count on key-identity being given away by repeats.’’21
As to the nine-channel traffic, Karrenberg stated that the Russians had
introduced two modifications during the war. First, the impulses of channels
17TICOM I-153, Second Interrogation of Uffz Karrenberg of OKH, on the Baudot-
Scrambler Machine (Bandwurm). NSA FOIA request, case #63702. 19 January 2011.
18TICOM I-30 Report on Interrogation of Uffz Karrenberg at Steeple Clayton on 7th July,
1945 at 1100 a.m. NARA-CP, Entry P 4 ‘‘Historians’ Source Files Relating to Target Intelli-
gence Committee Interrogation Reports,’’ Box 1, Item #6889.
19TICOM I-169 Report by Uffz. Karrenberg on the Bandwurm. NSA FOIA request, case
#64093. 29 March 2011.
20TICOM I-30, 2.
21TICOM I-169, 3–5.
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1–2, 3–4, and so on were interchanged, thus leaving the ninth channel clear.
Later channels 1–4 and 4–8 were scrambled, again leaving channel 9 in the clear.
Karrenberg felt that the Russians assumed that this was enough to secure the
system, but that a depth of 2,000 letters was enough to enable him to reconstruct
it [7, p. 41].
Traffic Analysis
The traffic analysis study by Magilavy and Uzielli at Steeple Clayton showed that
the bulk of the traffic was two-channel military, with commercial traffic passed in
the clear on six and nine channels. The message preambles and endings, such as orig-
inating station, serial numbers, group count, dates, address, routing, priority, and
indicator were mapped out. In addition, some internal police (SMERSH) traffic
was identified in the two-channel system. The frequencies used varied between 8
and 11MHz and were changed at irregular intervals, which were easily tracked from
the simple code used in the operator chat.22 The Russians had a lack of security
discipline when tuning, and operator chat often revealed the identity of the net.
The call signs of all Soviet ground stations were made up of three letter characters,
or a combination of three letters and figures [6, vol. 9, p. 5, 17].
Once the key was recovered and traffic deciphered, there were further challenges.
Although commercial traffic was in plaintext Russian, military traffic was encoded
in a variety of systems, including two, three, four, and five figure and five letter
codes. A postwar TICOM chart lists 35 three-figure, over 40 four-figure, and at least
15 five-figure Russian codes attacked by the Germans [6, vol. 1, chart 1–2, 101–104].
How many of these codes were successfully read is not certain, but at least a few
were. At the highest level, most secret communications were five-figure codes
enciphered by one-time pads, a common practice of the Soviets, which the Germans
did not even bother to attack.23 The rest of the enciphered traffic was judged medium
grade, which ‘‘the German cryptanalysts state . . . readily yields a solution while the
One Time Pad messages are used only for traffic analysis. In general the Russian
cryptographic and communications security is very poor, in fact, incredibly poor.’’24
However, this German effort against Russian Baudot communications was not
without its problems and limitations. The war effort took many of the most experi-
enced and talented operators and evaluators into other assignments, leaving less
qualified and less motivated personnel in the unit. A post war U.S. Army intelligence
report concluded
It can be conclusively stated that the possibilities of the intercepting and
evaluating branch were not fully utilized. The ease with which important
results could have been obtained in unlimited quantities and in the
shortest length of time was not recognized, or it was not properly valued.
If the Russians now maintain operations in the same fashion, in less than
half a year there could be important results in evaluating, if a sufficient
number of baudot receivers are used’’ [12, p. 3].
22TICOM I-33, Report on Traffic Analysis of BAUDOT Traffic by Capt. Jack Magilavy,
A.U.S. and D.R. Uzielli, SIXTA. NARA-CP, RG 457, Entry 9037, Box 121, Item #11284.
23The famous ‘‘Venona’’ intercepted Soviet cables were of this type. See [2, p. 6].
24TICOM IF-162, 3.
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Gruppe VI remained at Ju¨terbog until the deteriorating situation forced them to
again retreat, first to Stuttgart and finally to Rosenheim in Southern Germany,
where they set up shop in the Poinier Kaserne and awaited their fate.
After the week of demonstrations at Steeple Clayton, the Karrenberg party was
transferred to the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (U.K.) for further
interrogations, which continued through October, November, and into December.
They were questioned about the German effort against Soviet communications,
NKVD signals, and German knowledge of Allied cipher machines, while Karrenberg
was questioned about the specifics of the Baudot intercept effort and his knowledge of
‘‘Bandwurm.’’25
After the conclusion of the testing week at Steeple Clayton, the British moved
the operation to its intercept station at Knockholt. Established in May 1942 at Ivy
Farm, Knockholt, Kent, it was an outstation of GC&CS designed specifically to
intercept German teleprinter traffic. It housed the Foreign Office Research and
Development Establishment (FORDE), created to intercept German teleprinter
Tunny traffic and transmit it to the cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park.26 By May
1945, it had a staff of 815 civilian and military personnel. With the drying up of
this traffic on VE day, Knockholt, with its specialized rhombic aerials, receiving
huts and trained operators, was looking for a new mission. As station director,
H. C. Kenworthy boasted in a November 1945 report ‘‘The Research Station, Lab-
oratory and Workshops authorized by the Director especially for Non-Morse is
able to tackle any problem put to it, and is able to arrive at solutions in a very
short time.’’27
Armed with their newfound knowledge and technology, the British went into
production of Russian teleprinter intelligence under the codename CAVIAR. Hoping
for quick success, the British built up the program throughout the summer and fall.
An example of their work can still be found in the archives, a collection of some two
score intercepts from the Berlin-Moscow Baudot circuit reporting Soviet ‘‘Y’’ service
data. These reports of wavelengths, bearings, station call signs and identities, and
content (probably plain language), show that the Soviets maintained an active
intercept and D=F program after the surrender and were now targeting the Western
allies. This data was sent in a code the Russian called ‘‘SANATORIJ,’’ a three-digit
code written in five digit groups that was being read in part by the British.28
25See for instance, TICOM I-30; TICOM I-149 Report by Uffz. Karrenberg and Collea-
gues on Allied Cipher Machines. Available from Christos Military and Intelligence Corner
(http://tinyurl.com/TICOM-I-149; accessed 16 October 2012); TICOM I-153; TICOM
I-168 Report by the Karrenberg Party on Miscellaneous Russian W=T. NSA FOIA Case#
63702; TICOM I-169; TICOM I-173 Report by the Karrenberg party on Russian W=T. NSA
FOIA Case# 63702; and TICOM IF-123 Consolidated Report on Information obtained from
the following: Erdmann, Grubler, Hempel, Karrenberg, Schmitz, Suschowk. CSDIC SIR
1717, NSA FOIA Case# 63702.
26For more information on this topic, see PRO History of interception of German teleprin-
ter communications (FISH) by Foreign Office station, Knockholt, by HC Kenworthy, GCCS.
HW 3=163.
27G.C.W.S. Ivy Farm, Knockholt Pound. Kent & Sussex History Forum (http://sussexhis
toryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=1471.msg4887#msg4887; accessed 1 November 2012); [2,
p. 14]; PRO. ‘‘Peace-Time Interception of Non-Morse Transmissions.’’ HW 14=137.
28‘‘Russian Y-Service Reports.’’ NARA-CP, RG 457, Entry 9032 HCC, Box 202, Item
#978; ‘‘Appendix D: Notes on Baudot Traffic’’ from folder ‘‘Baudot Charts Labeled
Appendix A, B, C, and D’’ RG 457, Entry 9032 HCC, Box 1473, Item # 4903.
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Shortly after VE day, negotiations began between GC&CS and the U.S.
Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board to extend their wartime cooperation
to the Russian problem. From the American perspective, as laid out by OP-20-G
Director Captain J. N. Wenger, cooperation with the British would provide a greater
volume of raw traffic, increase the overall effort, and increase the collection of
collateral information and physical possession of code books, translations of
messages, and other related materials due to the worldwide presence of the British
intelligence network. However, Wenger also expressed concerns about lack of American
security control over these British assets and the possibility of high policy complica-
tions due to deviations between American and British foreign policy, such as on
colonial policy.
Caviar
Internal discussions and negotiations with the British continued through the sum-
mer. Details of the exact nature of the material to be shared and the liaison
channels to be set up were completed by the end of July. The code name BOURBON
was adopted for this program, and exchange of this material began on 15 August.29
Undoubtedly, the CAVIAR material was a large part of the exchange.
The booty was divvied up by the end of July. The British sent one nine-channel
unit and two two-channel units to the United States for use by the Army and
Navy. Receivers, teleprinters, and associated spare parts were also sent along. By
September, OP-20-G, under the leadership of former TICOM officer Lt. Joseph
Eachus, was attacking the CAVIAR machine. However, by the following year,
CAVIAR began to run into difficulties in both the British and American intelligence
services, mainly due to personnel shortages caused by demobilization. The war diary
of OP-20-G4-A noted that in April 1946, ‘‘the big problem now coming up is
CAVIAR. The British and the Army have both dropped it temporarily, leaving us
with the whole responsibility. The greatest need is more long key, which is only
available by reading depth.’’ The following month, in relation to CAVIAR, ‘‘some
progress has been made on this, just how much will not be clear until the smoke blows
away.’’ Yet by early August, Cmdr. Howard Campaigne noted, ‘‘CAVIAR is
being put to bed by Blankinship as comfortably as possible. This is because lack of
personnel forces us to temporarily abandon this project.’’30
Conclusion
The legacy of the Russian Fish and CAVIAR lived on into the Cold War.
ASA collection and exploitation of Russian plain text teleprinter traffic began on
a part-time basis in 1946, probably utilizing the ability of the Russian Fish to inter-
cept nine-channel traffic. This program was expanded in May 1947 and placed under
the direction of Jacob ‘‘Jack’’ Gurin, an ASA Russian linguist, who had the insight
that this traffic, although individually not of much value, could in the aggregate
track strategic trends in the Soviet economy. This program, a sideshow at first,
29‘‘RATTAN Liaison.’’ NARA-CP, RG 457, Entry 9032 HCC, Box 1471, Item #4870.
30OP-20G4-A War Diaries, September 1945, April, May, and July 1946, and Campaigne,
handwritten note dated 7 August 1946. I thank Ralph Erskine for bringing these documents to
my attention.
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became crucial after ‘‘Black Friday,’’ 25 August 1948, when code and cipher changes
by the Russians dried up the traffic that had been exploited since the end of the war.
For many years, this traffic provided the only SIGINT insight into the Soviet
Union [16].31
Despite the wealth of information about the ‘‘Russian Fish’’ from recently
released TICOM documents, many details are still obscured in the mist of classi-
fication. Much of the cryptanalytic data provided by Karrenberg in 1945 are still
redacted.32 Many questions are still unanswered in the archives: Did the Anglo-
American SIGINT agencies produce their own (perhaps improved) version of the
‘‘Russian Fish’’? Did the allies ever reconstruct the Soviet cipher machine? Howmuch
of the Soviet two-channel military traffic was read in the immediate postwar era?
Did the CAVIAR program contribute to the breaking of the Longfellow and
Coleridge machine systems? Hopefully, historians must not wait another 70 years
for the mist to clear.
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